Comments on the Challenger Disaster

Larry Nowak

Having watched all segments of the Netflix coverage of the Challenger disaster, I concluded that there are two basic questions being covered. The first is how did they decide to launch on such a cold day in January and how did our candidate Greg Jarvis get bumped from April 1985 to January 1986.

I was down at the Cape the previous year in January 1985 prepping our first LEASAT spacecraft for launch. There was a shuttle launch that afternoon around 3 PM; it was a very cold day. The launch was a success, but recovery of the solid motors showed major leakage around the seals and almost a total burn though.  I believe these photos were used in the Netflix documentary.

The Thiokol workers knew that the seals were a major problem and needed to be fixed.  A design change was initiated but had not been finalized and implemented for the Challenger launch.

The movie seemed to indicate that they didn’t know the cause of failure at the time of launch. With the history of seal leakage, I was surprised when they did launch on that fateful day when there were icicles hanging from the launch vehicle.

As Steve pointed out, NASA was trying to use the shuttle for all launches. Their aggressive schedule was to launch at least two per month and up to four spacecraft per launch. Any delays by one would probably bump the launch dates for all the others to later dates (my conclusion).  This would be a major cost overrun I’m sure.

Apparently, the new criteria to launch was changed from “Prove it is OK to launch” to “Prove it’s not OK to launch”.  Following the disaster, the launch schedule was delayed until the mod had been authorized and implemented. As the movie points out, there were no more rocket failures after this change had been implemented.

So how did Greg get bumped to this fateful launch date?  Greg was originally assigned to be on a launch in April 1985 along with our LEASAT F3 spacecraft.  Senator Jake Garn was assigned to a TRW spacecraft the previous month. That one had problems and was scrubbed. He then bumped Greg because the rules allowed him to do that. Greg could have been on the next launch in September with our F4 but F3, which Jake Garn took, failed to activate properly upon deployment. Subsequent meetings with NASA personal showed F3 could be saved by installing a bypass switch around the malfunctioning switch. This did not allow Greg to ride along.  

I think Greg could have taken the next flight scheduled for December but thought it would be a better choice to go with the schoolteacher, Christa McAuliffe in January and help her with her activities. I also heard a rumor that Rep Bill Nelson didn’t want to fly with Christa because she would get all the news coverage. Greg agreed to switch to the January 1986 flight and all were happy.

TACSAT Preview—Tony Iorillo

Recently I contacted Tony and asked about the preliminaries that led up to the TACSAT contract.  He responded and covered a lot more ground.  I thought his response merited posting on our website.  Jack Fisher

As I recall, TACSAT was like any other SAMSO program.  They put out pre-RFP notice in 1966 that they were interested in buying a satellite with the specs which Dick described¹.  Our Space Division marketing team followed the development of TACSAT specs very carefully.  There was another contemporaneous procurement SAMSO was working on that we also followed carefully—the DSP ballistic missile early warning satellite.
Ultimately, we had to decide which program to go after because we did not have the resources to compete vigorously for both.  Having recently failed to beat TRW for both Intelsat III and a classified program for the NRO, we needed a win.

Paul Visher, our assistant division manager and Bud Franklin, our manager of Advanced Projects, chose TACSAT as the target.  As Dick Brandes wrote¹, they believed that the TACSAT satellite configuration was more representative of future program targets than the peculiar DSP configuration.  Paul foresaw the HS318 ( our “green” program ) and the  Intelsat IV programs which were to evolve shortly after the start of TACSAT in 1967.  So, TRW won the DSP contract.  We won TACSAT.  In 1967 and 1968, even before TACSAT was launched, we used the TACSAT win as our relevant related experience. 

With a large satellite configuration in hand, we beat TRW, and others, for the HS-318 and Intelsat IV contracts.  These wins came just in time to prevent having to lay off the Surveyor and Intelsat II teams whose programs were ending.  Even TACSAT was to end in a year.  Thanks to Mr, Hyland’s foresight and faith, the bulk of these people were carried for many months entirely on company funding
   
Bob Roney became our new Space Division manager shortly before the wins were announced in 1968.  At an all hands meeting, the day he took over, Bob informed us that our division had but a 60-day backlog.  Dick Brandes and I still recall the tension felt by all in the room.

In 1970, with both programs underway, we then had enough stable business to finally become a Group, and Bud Wheelon joined us as Group Executive.  The rest is history pretty much as Steve Dorfman wrote².  He, too, was limited by security restrictions to paint a complete picture.  For the record, in 1972, we beat TRW again for the SDS relay satellite contract.
Twenty years later, with our new HS 601 design, we were to beat TRW and GE for the AUSSAT and Navy UHF Follow-on contracts.

During the TACSAT years. In 1964, Paul Visher allocated IR&D funds for me to complete the analytical work deriving the stability rules for dual-spin satellites, Hughes Gyrostats.  The next year, Bernie Burns and I built some small spinning models which were enough to convince management that the analyses were correct. Fortunately, Doctors Puckett, Roney and Adler were steeped enough in spin dynamics to agree.So, when TACSAT came along my task was to build demonstration models elaborate enough to convince SAMSO and Aerospace management.  John Neer wrote about this work³.

     We also hired UCLA Professor Peter Likens, to study my analyses, and to work with Dr. Tino Mingori of Aerospace to promulgate the results. When we submitted our proposal, the novelty of the design was not an issue with the technical evaluators.  And, as Dick Brandes wrote, our proposal was very cost competitive because we valued the future prospects¹.  Peter went on to become President of Lehigh university and, later, the University of Arizona.

      After we won TACSAT, I worked on both the HS318 “green” program and Intelsat IV proposals.  Bill Bakemeyer was the “green” proposal manager and Al Owens was the Intelsat IV proposal manager.  I was in charge of the Technical Volumes and Executive Summaries for both.  The proposals were sequential, with brief overlaps, so that I could do both.  I used many of the same staff.  For example, Al Wittman was the principal Design Integration leader for both.  The “green” program was much more demanding.  It was our first entry into the operational world of satellite reconnaissance.  And it was not a geostationary orbit mission.  The satellite was a multi-mission vehicle carrying an electro-optical precision pointed payload and a very wide band ELINT payload with large steerable receive and downlink antennas.  We also designed and built the elaborate ground data processing segments for both payloads along with the satellite command and control station.  The Surveyor guys were perfect for the job.

Jim Cloud was the program manager, aided by Bill Bakemeyer, Shel Shallon, Warren Nichols, Frank Wolf and many other Surveyor veterans. Their contract performance was spectacular. The satellites and the ground segments worked as planned and it was done on schedule and pretty close to our budget.  The program was still going when I retired.  Intelsat IV was a relatively straightforward next generation Comsat.  I then went on to manage the SDS relay satellite proposal, our “yellow” program.  This time I stayed on as deputy to Roger Clapp until the first launch.

Reference 1. TACSAT, Dick Brandes

Reference 2.  A (Very) Short History of the Space and Communication Activities of Hughes Aircraft Company–Steve Dorfman

Reference 3. On the Gyrostat Road, John Neer

Caught Blue Handed or Rewriting History Can Be Problematic–Bernie Bienstock

In 2003, when Boeing was collaborating with JPL on a probe proposal, it occurred to me that a brochure should be developed for the upcoming 2^ndInternational Planetary Probe Workshop at NASA Ames. I convinced Boeing management of the merit of this concept and began working with Jim Santoni, our resident graphics guru. We reviewed the archives of the Pioneer Venus and Galileo programs to find the photos that would most convincingly send the message that we had the experience needed to design planetary entry probes for future NASA missions.

One photo caught my eye. It captured our skilled technicians deep in the final assembly of the Galileo probe. They were carefully positioning the aft cover on the descent vehicle installed in the deceleration module. There was only one problem with the photo: the technicians were touching extremely valuable hardware with their bare hands. One was even wearing a ring. Knowing this 1980’s practice was certainly not consistent with the rules enforced in the early 2000s, I asked Jim to retouch the photo. For the brochure, he graphically applied gloves to the technicians’ hands. The cover of the brochure is included below, with the blue-gloved hands of the technicians clearly visible.

Several years later, as I was chatting with a young engineer about my experiences on the Pioneer Venus and the Galileo probes, he mentioned that he had seen the original photo of technicians. He recalled that the photo captured the technicians working without gloves. There I was, caught blue-handed as I explained how we had retouched the original photo for the brochure.

Bill Murray’s Launch Photos–Jack Fisher

Some time ago, perhaps several years, Maggy Murray, Bill’s wife, contacted me and volunteered some of Bill’s mementos for our website.  Included were photographs of a number of launches of Hughes satellites.  Unfortunately, these photos did not have a caption that identified the satellites being launched.  I filed these away and forgot them until recently.  Looking at the photos I realized that the launch vehicles were numbered and that would allow identification of the Hughes satellite being launched.

I found a website, KevinForsyth.net, that listed all the numbered Delta launches that allowed identification of the Hughes satellites. I also learned that the Delta is no longer in production and the last launch was on September 15, 2018 for a NASA mission, ICESAT-2.  There were a total of 381 Delta launches with only 16 failures, a reliability of almost 96%.

Information on Centaur launches can be found on Gunter’s Space Page.

 

Delta B Syncom II launch July 26, 1963

 

Delta D Syncom III launch August 19, 1964

 

Delta D Earlybird on Launch Pad April 1965

 

Delta D Earlybird Launch April 6, 1965

Delta E1 Intelsat II F1 launch October 26, 1966

 

Atlas Centaur AC35 Intelsat IV F1 launch May 22, 1975

 

The Magnetic Pioneer Venus Orbiter—Jack Fisher Revised September 18, 2018

The Pioneer Venus Orbiter incorporated a payload of 12 scientific instruments one of which was a fluxgate magnetometer provided by Chris Russell of UCLA, the principal investigator.  Previous flybys of Venus had revealed that the magnetic field of Venus was much weaker than Earth’s.  The resulting system requirements for the Orbiter magnetic fields are shown in Figure 4-2 in Reference 1.  The most challenging requirement is that the remnant field at the magnetometer (after a 50-gauss demagnetization of the spacecraft) be 0.5 gamma or less.  A Gauss is the usual measure used in magnetics—a gamma is 0.00001 Gauss.  The earth’s surface magnetic field varies from 0.3 to 0.6 Gauss.

These requirements presented some issues that Hughes had not dealt with previously.  At the beginning of the PV program no one at Hughes that I knew had experience in this area.  Very fortuitously at this time we received an application from a TRW engineer, Chris Thorpe, who had performed these tasks for the TRW Pioneer spacecraft and had worked with Chris Russell previously.  We hired him very quickly into the Perry Ackerman lab and assigned him to PV program.  Chris was a delightful Englishman with a wry sense of humor and supported me in systems engineering and Tony Lauletta in science integration throughout the program.

Chris quickly demonstrated his knowledge of spacecraft magnetics and instituted a magnetic control program that included:

• Formulating and maintaining a magnetic model of the Orbiter that predicted the magnetic field at the magnetometer
• Limiting the type and amount of magnetic materials used in fabrication.
• Using a nonmagnetic electroless nickel plate
• Controlling the location and orientation of magnetically troublesome units on the equipment shelf.
• Separating the magnetometer from the spacecraft by a deployable boom
• Provide for magnetic compensation of units that utilize permanent magnets in their operation to reduce their field contribution at the magnetometer

Based on Chris’ calculations the boom length was set at 15 ft 6 in. (4.72 meters).  As I recall Chris’s prediction was 14.5 feet and one foot was added to provide some margin.  Chris maintained the magnetic model throughout the Orbiter development.

The boom, consisting of three hinged segments, is folded together and stowed on the orbiter shelf until deployed shortly after launch.  The boom is secured by two redundant pyrotechnic pinpullers either of which when fired would release the boom for deployment. As the three segments extend, each hinged joint locks in the deployed position.  A spin rate of 6.5 rpm provides the centrifugal force that ensures deployment and positive latching.

System level testing of the magnetometer boom proved to be problematic.  The boom root hinge, when pyrotechnically released, was to deploy with the spacecraft spinning at 6.5 rpm.  However, aerodynamic drag prevented the boom from fully extending in sea level density air.  In order to validate the design it was necessary to encapsulate the spacecraft in a large plastic tent filled with 90% helium that provide a gas mixture with one fifth the density of air.  The deployment test in this environment was successful.

Two system level magnetic tests are required—remanent and stray field determination.  The remanent test is to determine the magnetic field of the quiescent spacecraft and requires a magnetic coil to cancel the earth’s magnetic field.  The NASA Ames facility Magnetic Standards Laboratory and Test Facility in Mountain View, CA was used for this test and of course this required shipping the spacecraft to that facility.  Tests were conducted with the spacecraft in a magnetized and demagnetized state.  The stray field test to determine the magnetic field of the operating spacecraft was conducted in the Hughes high bay in the early morning to provide a magnetically quiet environment.  The test results are presented in Figure 4.2 in from Reference 1.  Chris Thorpe oversaw these tests.

According to Chris Russell:  The most definitive measurements of the magnetic moment of Venus were obtained during the Pioneer Venus Orbiter mission in its first years of operation (1979-1981). Repeated low-altitude (~ 150 km) passes by that spacecraft over the antisolar region, coupled with dayside observations to the same altitude, proved the insignificance of a field of internal origin in near-Venus space. The observed fields for the most part could be explained as solar wind interaction-induced features. The new upper limit on the dipole moment obtained from the Pioneer Venus Orbiter wake measurements placed the Venus intrinsic magnetic field at ~ 10^-5 times that of Earth.

At the conclusion of the Pioneer Venus program Chris and I were assigned to the newly started Galileo probe effort.  After I left Galileo I lost track of Chris.  Recently I learned that he passed away in 2000 at the age of 76.   If someone can provide any biographical details for Chris I can add them to this post.

Reference 1.  Pioneer Venus Final Report, Contract No. NAS 2-8300, December 1978, Bernard J. Bienstock.

 

Pioneer Venus Mass Properties—Jack Fisher

The two Pioneer Venus spacecraft were designed to be launched by the Atlas-Centaur for the 1978 Venus opportunity.  Earlier studies had considered the Thor-Delta launch vehicle, but the Atlas-Centaur was judged by NASA to provide superior science performance and potential cost savings due to the greater payload capability.  The starting point for spacecraft design is the allowable mass for the two spacecraft that is determined by the performance of the designated launch vehicle.  Our customer, NASA’s Ames Research Center, adopted a specification weight for us to work to allowing for a cushion or contingency below the Atlas-Centaur launch capability.  The ARC specification values, as a function of time, are shown in Figures 4-1 and 4-2 for the Orbiter and Multiprobe spacecrafts.

The 1978 Venus launch opportunity can be divided into two phases.  The earlier launch opportunity, late May-early June, has a greater flight time to Venus and is a Type II interplanetary trajectory traversing an arc of more than 180^O about the sun.  However, this launch requires greater launch vehicle performance and provide less payload capability.  The later launches in August, use a Type I interplanetary trajectory (less than 180^O solar arc) and provide more than a 50% greater payload capability.  As neither Hughes nor NASA Ames could support two simultaneous launch campaigns the Orbiter and Multiprobe require using both the early and late launch opportunities for the 1978 Venus opportunity.  The Orbiter weight was significantly less than the Multiprobe and could launched during the earlier opportunity.  An advantage is the 60% lower ∆V required for orbit insertion at Venus.  The August launch opportunity is then available for the 60% heavier Multiprobe.

The final mass properties measurements for the two spacecraft are shown in Table 4-1 from the Reference 1.  Note that the first row in the Table which is labeled “Spacecraft height” should read “Spacecraft weight.”  Both spacecraft are stable spinners based upon the HS-333 design.

Joe Lotta was responsible for the Pioneer Venus mass properties analyses.  This involved collecting inputs from each design area on a monthly basis and calculating the overall mass properties for each spacecraft.  As shown in Figures 4-1 and 4-2 from Reference 1, over the course of the nearly four-year program weight growth was a constant concern.  Considerable effort was devoted to trying to control weight growth and finding weight savings.  At every opportunity trade-offs were considered and lists of weight savings with the cost detailed for each saving would be considered.  Those weight savings characterized by lower dollars per pound would be implemented.  Reference 1 documents 90 pounds of savings implemented for the Orbiter and 105 pounds for the Multiprobe.  NASA ARC was able to provide increases in their specification weights to accommodate our weight growth.  Some must have been due to Atlas Centaur performance improvements and the rest due to reduced contingencies and weight reserves.  In retrospect it all came together and we witnessed two very successful missions.

Reference 1.  Pioneer Venus Final Project Report.  HS507-7970. December 1978, Bernard J. Bienstock.

Pioneer Venus Award Fee Determination–Steve Dorfman

The attached IDC, by Steve Dorfman, outlines for the Pioneer Venus team award fee based upon NASA’s evaluation of Hughes performance.  Note that Tables 3 and 4 are missing and Table 7 is not mentioned in the text.

Pioneer Venus Cost Growth Analysis

The attached letter, dated 27 August, 1979, from Dr. Wheelon to C. A. Syvertson, director of NASA’s Ames Research Center, analyzes the cost growth in Hughes’ Pioneer Venus program.  The contract was cost plus award fee and what was at stake here was the determination by the Ames Performance Evaluation Board of Hughes’ award fee.  This analysis was undertaken at the invitation of Ames to provide the causes for the program cost growth.

The following comments have been added by Steve Dorfman:

Of course I wrote the letter and NASA took mercy.  They appointed Tom Young from NASA HQ to adjudicate and he came up with 2% fee in a Solomon-like decision which gave us a $2M profit instead of a significant loss due to our aggressive cost share proposal which, in hindsight, was way too risky.  We had proposed this aggressive cost share, which had us going to negative fee (that is losing money) to be consistent with NASA HQ desire to have a management experiment in reducing the cost of planetary programs. However Charlie Hall ignored the “management experiment” and ran the program just as he had all Pioneer programs.  In hindsight Charlie was right and NASA HQ was wrong and naive and so were we. Tom Young knew all this and that is why he gave us a modest fee.

In fact the program was an outstanding success in keeping costs low when compared with other NASA Planetary Programs.  For $105M  Hughes achieved a technically ambitious and difficult program.  A bargain.

 

 

 

Mission Design and Orbit Operations for the First Lunar Flyby Rescue Mission–J. Salvatore, C. Ocampo

Preface

Jerry presented this paper presented at the 50th International Astronautical Congress, 4 – 8 October 1999, Amsterdam, Netherlands see www.iafastro.org.  It details the recovery operations, led by Jerry, for the Hughes HGS-1 satellite that was launched for Asia Satellite Communications Ltd.  Our search of the International Astronautical Foundation (IAF) online archives reveals that this paper or any reference to it is not available.  The IAF indicates that no papers prior to 2004 are available.  We feel that researchers should have online access to this paper as it is the definitive reference for this recovery mission.

Many wonderful and talented people at Hughes contributed to the success of this mission.  A tribute to many of them as well as other contributors around the world is illustrated in the official mission poster which bears the signatures of all those folks.

 

 

Three Domestic Systems For U. S. to Get HAC Craft Hughes News September 14, 1973

$150 Million Satellite Projects Seen

Hughes Aircraft Company’s Space and Communications Group will have an additional $150 millions in business with the decision by the Federal Communications Commission to authorize five additional domestic satellite systems.

Granted were applications by American Satellite Corporation, RCA Global Communications, GTE/Hughes Satellite Corporation, American Telephone and Telegraph Company/Comsat and Communications Satellite Corporation.

Hughes will build the satellites for the AMSAT, GTE/Hughes and ATT/Comsat systems.  The company last week signed a $65.9 million contract with Comsat for four satellites to serve the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.

(Previously, the FCC had approved an application by Western Union Telegraph Company, for which Hughes will build three satellites.)

Vice President Albert D. Wheelon, Group executive said the FCC decision was welcome for two reasons:  “Approximately $200 million of private capital will be invested in the aerospace industry.  Part of this investment will go to McDonnell-Douglas and General Dynamics companies for rocket boosters.  The remainder is for the communications satellites to be built for the ATT/Comsat, GTE/Hughes, and ATT/Comsat systems.”

Dr. Wheelon added, “This is the largest single injection of private capital into the space industry and marks a turning point in that it represents the development of a substantial non-government market for spacecraft and booster manufacturers.  This opportunity comes at a time when defense and NASA funding of satellite development is declining and is thus doubly welcome.”

“While communications satellites have been used to carry international traffic for 10 years, U. S. space technology will now be put to work for the 200 million people who supported the development of this technology.  With the Western Union systems authorized early this year, the decision by the FCC guarantees that a breadth of innovative and improved domestic communications services will be available starting in 1974”